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Abstract
The vulnerability of automatic speaker verification (ASV) sys-
tems to spoofing is widely acknowledged. Recent years have
seen an intensification in research efforts to develop spoofing
countermeasures, also known as presentation attack detection
(PAD) systems. Much of this work has involved the exploration
of features that discriminate reliably between bona fide and
spoofed speech. While there are grounds to use different front-
ends for ASV and PAD systems (they are different tasks) the
use of a single front-end has obvious benefits, not least conve-
nience and computational efficiency, especially when ASV and
PAD are combined. This paper investigates the performance of
a variety of different features used previously for both ASV and
PAD and assesses their performance when combined for both
tasks. The paper also presents a Gaussian back-end fusion ap-
proach to system combination. In contrast to cascaded architec-
tures, it relies upon the modelling of the two-dimensional score
distribution stemming from the combination of ASV and PAD
in parallel. This approach to combination is shown to gener-
alise particularly well across independent ASVspoof 2017 v2.0
development and evaluation datasets.
Index Terms: automatic speaker verification, spoofing, coun-
termeasures, presentation attack detection
1. Introduction
Presentation attack detection (PAD) systems capable of detect-
ing and deflecting so-called spoofing attacks, or presentation
attack (PA) in ISO/IEC 301071 nomenclature, leveled at au-
tomatic speaker verification (ASV) systems have been under
development for a number of years. While ASV systems aim
to verify the identity claimed by a speaker, PAD systems aim
to verify the authenticity of the speech signal itself, namely
whether it is bona fide speech or whether, instead, it is artifi-
cially created or somehow manipulated, i.e. spoofed.
While early PAD systems used features similar to those
used for ASV, being distinctly different tasks, most efforts to de-
velop effective PAD systems have focused on the design of new
features tailored to discriminate between bona fide and spoofed
speech. While the use of features designed specifically for PAD
have been shown to give better performance than systems that
1https://www.iso.org/standard/67381.html
use features designed for ASV, the use of different front-ends
augments computational complexity.
It can hence be convenient to use a single front-end. The
use of such a single front-end avoids redundant processing and
can also simplify the combination of ASV and PAD decisions.
The search for features which perform well for a combined ASV
and PAD task is the subject of this paper.
A second contribution relates to the manner in which ASV
and PAD systems scores can be combined. It extends previ-
ous work [1] which proposed cascade and parallel approaches
to system combination and is similar in nature to the combina-
tion architecture reported in [2]. New to this paper is a two-
dimensional score modelling technique which avoids the joint
optimisation of separate ASV and PAD decision thresholds.
The explicit modelling of target and impostor trial scores en-
compassing genuine, bona fide trials in addition to both zero-
effort and spoofed impostor trials provides for greater flexibil-
ity in decision boundaries and hence more reliable decisions.
The merits of these two contributions are assessed through ex-
periments with the ASVspoof 2017 database of bona fide and
spoofed speech signals and protocols for the assessment of com-
bined ASV and PAD systems.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Sec-
tion 2 describes the different front-ends used in this work. The
approach to system combination is presented in Section 3. Ex-
periments are reported in Section 4 whereas results are reported
in Section 5. Conclusions are presented in Section 6.
2. Front-end processing
This paper aims to determine a common front-end for both
ASV and PAD tasks. While ASV calls for features that capture
speaker-discriminant information, PAD systems rely on features
that capture the tell-tale signs of spoofing. The study includes
four different front-ends, each of which is described here.
Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs): MFCCs are
used widely in speech and speaker recognition and have been
explored extensively as features for spoofing detection [3].
MFCCs are usually derived from short-time Fourier transform
(STFT) decompositions, the application of perceptually moti-
vated Mel-frequency scaled filterbank [4] and standard cepstral
analysis.
Table 1: Classification of trials in PAD and ASV tasks. By “–”
we assume that ASV has zero or no capability to reject spoof-
ing imposter trials, similarly for PAD that cannot differentiate
zero-effort imposter and target trials. Alternatively “–” means
arbitrary: since the last row corresponds to the logical AND op-
erator to combine the two systems, choosing either +1 or -1 in
the place of “–” gives rise to the same trial classifications for
the integrated system.
class C1 C2 C3
system/trial target zero-effortnontarget
spoof
nontarget
PAD +1 – -1
ASV +1 -1 –
ASV + PAD +1 -1 -1
Linear frequency cepstral coefficients (LFCCs): LFCCs are
similar to MFCC except for the use of a linear-scaled in place
of a Mel-scaled filterbank, thereby giving a constant spectral
resolution. LFCCs have also been applied to both speech and
speaker recognition, in addition to spoofing detection [3].
Infinite impulse response constant Q Mel cepstral coeffi-
cients (ICMCs): ICMCs have been applied successfully to
ASV [5], utterance verification (UV) [5] and speaker diariza-
tion [6]. Features are based upon the perceptually-motivated
infinite impulse response constant Q transform (IIR-CQT) ap-
proach to spectro-temporal decomposition [7]. In contrast to
the STFT, the spectral resolution has a constant Q factor which
reflects filter selectivity, defined as the ratio between the cen-
tre frequency and bandwidth. Efficient feature extraction is
obtained from the IIR filtering of the fast Fourier transform
(FFT) giving a variable-resolution decomposition with greater
frequency resolution at low frequencies and greater time res-
olution at higher frequencies. ICMCs are then obtained from
Mel-scaling and standard cepstral analysis.
Constant Q cepstral coefficients (CQCCs): CQCC features
were designed specifically for spoofing detection [8, 9] and ap-
plied subsequently to ASV [10]. CQCCs rely on the same CQT
approach used in ICMCs but are extracted according to the more
computationally demanding approach described in [11,12]. Re-
sampling [9] is applied to warp the geometric scale of the CQT
to the linear scale of the discrete Cosine transform (DCT).
3. Integration of PAD with ASV
The integration of ASV and PAD can be achieved at the
model/feature level [13] or at the score level [1]. This paper fo-
cuses on the latter. Dedicated classifiers are developed for ASV
and PAD, and scores produced by each system are combined
(i.e., late fusion). Even at this score level, there are different ap-
proaches to combination including both cascaded and parallel
combinations [1]. We describe below the cascade approach and
then the proposed Gaussian back-end fusion approach.
3.1. Task and trial definitions
Whereas ASV and PAD systems are both binary classifiers, they
tackle different tasks. Table 1 defines the three different types
of trial that ASV and PAD systems may encounter: (1) target,
(2) zero-effort nontarget and (3) spoof nontarget trials. Also
illustrated in Table 1 are the ground-truth labels for each task
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Figure 1: A two-dimensional view of the score space formed by
PAD and ASV scores.
and trial combination. PAD systems aim to distinguish bona
fide speech from spoofed speech, while ASV systems aim to
verify a claimed identity.
This same idea is illustrated in the two-dimensional score
space of Fig. 1. For a threshold θ2 applied to PAD scores
sPAD, all trials for which the score is greater than the threshold,
sPAD > θ2, are classified as bona fide speech. Those for which
the score is below the threshold are classified as presentation at-
tack speech. Similarly, for a threshold θ1 applied to ASV scores
sASV, all trials for which the score is greater than the threshold,
sASV > θ1, are classified as genuine speaker trials. Those for
which the score is below the threshold are classified as impos-
tor trials. The green-colored region to the upper-right-hand cor-
ner of Fig. 1, where {sPAD > θ2} ∩ {sASV > θ1}, corresponds
to target trials (class C1). Class C2 (zero-effort nontarget) is
represented by the blue-colored region, which is the resultant
of the impostor and bona fide axes. Similarly, class C3 (spoof
nontarget) is represented by the red-colored region, which is the
resultant of the target and spoofed axes. As shown in Table 1,
only target trials should be positively verified. Both forms of
nontarget trial should be rejected.
3.2. Cascaded/tandem combination
ASV and PAD systems can be cascaded in either order – PAD
followed by ASV, or ASV followed by PAD. ASV and PAD
systems can be optimised independently or jointly, e.g. con-
sidering an architecture whereby PAD precedes ASV, then the
PAD threshold θ2 can be optimised, for instance, to minimise
the equal error rate (EER) of the ASV system. In order to esti-
mate the performance of the integrated system, trials classified
as spoofs are assigned arbitrarily −∞ scores and are thereby
rejected automatically by the ASV system that follows.
The cascaded approach relies on two thresholds, θ2 and θ1,
applied to PAD and ASV scores, respectively. The cascading of
ASV and PAD in such a way is equivalent to the partitioning of
the score space into rigid decision regions with the vertical and
horizontal decision boundaries being those illustrated in Fig. 1.
3.3. Gaussian back-end fusion
In contrast to the cascaded approach to combination involving
the optimisation of two different thresholds for PAD and ASV,
the parallel approach to combination requires the optimisation
of only a single threshold. Recall the N = 3 classes of trial
illustrated in Table 1, namely target (C1), zero-effort nontarget
(C2) and spoof nontarget (C3). Let s = [sPAD, sASV]T ∈ R2 be
a two-dimensional score vector of PAD and ASV scores corre-
sponding to a single ASV trial.
We treat s as a 2D feature vector and model the class-
conditional probability density of s using a Gaussian
p(s|Cl) = N (s|µl,Σl),
where µl ∈ R2 and Σl ∈ R2×2 are the mean vector and the co-
variance matrix corresponding to class Cl where l ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
For each trial t, a fused score is computed as the log-likelihood
ratio according to:
s˜t = log
p(st|H0)
p(st|H1)
= log
p(st|C1)
α× p(st|C2) + (1− α)× p(st|C3) ,
(1)
where the null hypothesis H0 represents the likelihood that st
is a target speaker trial (from class C1) while the alternative hy-
pothesis H1 signifies that st belongs to either C2 or C3. There-
fore, (1) converts the 2D detection score vector st into a log-
likelihood ratio, a scalar where higher relative values are asso-
ciated with a stronger support for the null hypothesis. Classi-
fication decisions corresponding to the last line of Table 1 may
then be made upon the application of a single threshold θ to s˜t.
Note that the alternative hypothesis likelihood in the de-
nominator of (1) represents, in fact, a 2-component GMM with
mixing weight α. The hyper-parameter α ∈ [0, 1], determines
the weight of C2 and C3 in the denominator of Eq. 1 (the al-
ternative hypothesis). Parameters µl, Σl and threshold θ can be
learned from development data.
3.4. Modeling capacity of the two integration approaches
The cascaded approach has two parameters that require opti-
mization — the thresholds θ1 and θ2. The Gaussian back-end
approach, in turn, has 3× 2 = 6 parameters to specify the three
mean vectors, 3 × 3 = 9 parameters to specify the three co-
variance matrices (they are symmetric so 3 parameters are suf-
ficient), one combination parameter α, plus the final decision
threshold, i.e. a total of 6 + 9 + 1 = 16 parameters.
While the number of parameters in the Gaussian back-end
fusion approach is greater than that for the cascaded approach,
generative score modelling offer better potential for generaliza-
tion. In specific, the decision regions in the cascaded approach
have a limited modeling capacity: as illustrated in Fig. 1, the de-
cision region for the target class is an infinite rectangular region,
with the lower left corner at (θ1, θ2). Since the joint distribu-
tion of the PAD and ASV scores is certainly not defined by such
regions, the cascaded approach has limited modeling power. In
the Gaussian back-end fusion, in turn, we use three Gaussians
with arbitrary (non-shared) covariance matrices, which yields
generally a more complex nonlinear decision boundary [14] and
makes the model better adaptable to arbitrary scores.
Similar 2D back-end fusions have been used earlier in the
context of general biometrics and joint operation of PAD and
biometric modalities, e.g. [2] and [15]. The authors of [2, 15]
used a linear classifier whose parameters (i.e. slope and inter-
cept) were trained using a logistic loss.
4. Experimental setup
This section describes the database used in this work with im-
plementation details for the individual PAD and ASV systems.
4.1. ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 database and protocols
Experiments relate to the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 database [16]
of bona-fide and replayed, spoofed short utterances of about
1 to 5 seconds each. PAD systems are trained using the of-
ficial training partition containing 1507 bona fide and 1507 re-
played speech segments. Joint PAD and ASV experiments were
performed using a specifically designed protocol encompassing
target segments and both zero-effort and spoofed speech seg-
ments2. The number of speakers and trials in the development
and evaluation sets are illustrated in Table 3.
4.2. Front-ends
Experiments were conducted using the four front-ends de-
scribed in Section 2 using pre- and post-processing comprising
the addition of log-energy parameters, cepstral mean and vari-
ance normalization (CMVN) [17], relative spectral (RASTA)
filtering [18] and articulation rate (ARTE) filtering [10]. Dy-
namic coefficients up to double deltas are also considered.
The configuration of MFCCs and LFCCs is standard: 19
(S)tatic coefficients (excluding the 0-th), RASTA filtering with
appended (D)elta and (A)cceleration coefficients. The ICMC
configuration is that reported in [19] and is the same as for
MFCCs. Based on configurations used previously for text-
dependent ASV [10] and PAD [16], CQCCs includes 29 S
coefficients with appended D coefficients, ARTE filtering and
log-energy coefficients. None of the experiments reported here
use speech activity detection (SAD). Any single experiment re-
ported in this paper involve PAD and ASV systems that use the
exact same front-end configurations.
4.3. PAD and ASV systems
Both the PAD and the ASV classifiers are conventional Gaus-
sian mixture models (GMMs). The PAD classifier uses mod-
els of 512 components. Models are learned for bona fide and
spoofed speech with an expectation-maximisation (EM) algo-
rithm with random initialisation. Classifier scores for a given
test utterance are computed as the log-likelihood ratio between
the GMMs for bona fide and spoofed speech. The ASV clas-
sifier also uses models of 512 components and learns speaker
specific models from the maximum a posteriori (MAP) adap-
tation of a universal background model (UBM) trained on the
RSR2015 database [20]. Scores are the log-likelihood ratio
given the target model and the UBM.
4.4. Integration of PAD and ASV
Concerning the Gaussian back-end fusion described in Sec-
tion 3.3, we use maximum likelihood to obtain the means and
covariances of all the three classes (C1, C2 and C3). The value
of α is set empirically to 0.96 using a grid search on the devel-
opment set.
5. Experimental results and discussion
Results are presented in Table 2 for development (D) and eval-
uation (E) partitions of the joint PAD-ASV protocol (see Ta-
ble 3). Results are presented for each front-end and for the cas-
caded combination and the proposed Gaussian backend fusion
(bottom part of Table 2). The performance of two alternative
methods, namely linear regression (LR) and polynomial linear
2Note to the Interspeech reviewers: this custom protocol will be
made public later on, to ensure reproducibility.
Table 2: Speaker verification performance in terms of EER using linear regression fusion, polynomial logistic regression fusion, cas-
cade/tandem combination and proposed Gaussian back-end fusion of PAD and ASV scores for the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 database. D:
development set, E: evaluation set. The best average results for development set are shown in boldface.
impostor type zero-effort spoof average zero-effort spoof average
feat. config /
tested on D E D E D E D E D E D E
Logistic regression fusion [2] Polynomial logistic regression fusion [2]
MFCC 3.78 2.42 42.72 31.02 23.25 16.72 3.86 2.50 43.81 35.14 23.84 18.82
LFCC 5.72 2.11 46.41 35.71 26.06 18.91 5.47 2.20 37.64 26.99 21.55 14.60
ICMC 2.67 2.16 43.60 33.59 23.14 17.88 2.60 2.08 37.58 29.31 20.09 15.69
CQCC 6.02 3.52 38.76 33.17 22.39 18.34 6.02 7.93 42.67 47.96 24.34 27.94
Cascaded/tandem combination Gaussian back-end fusion
MFCC 5.19 5.36 23.07 24.65 14.13 15.00 3.99 3.26 21.02 24.35 12.51 13.81
LFCC 7.28 4.96 22.41 21.28 14.84 13.12 5.71 2.90 21.26 17.98 13.48 10.43
ICMC 4.30 4.92 27.08 27.82 15.69 16.37 3.06 3.71 20.90 22.51 11.98 13.11
CQCC 7.31 8.30 15.71 25.26 11.51 16.78 6.04 4.71 17.34 18.11 11.69 11.41
Table 3: Statistics of the ASVspoof 2017 joint PAD+ASV proto-
col.
#spk target zero-effort spoof
Dev. 8 742 5186 940
Eval. 24 1106 18624 10878
regression (PLR) fusion approaches [2], is also reported (top
part of Table 2). These contrastive methods also aim to split the
2D score space into two classes. Results are also presented sep-
arately for target trials combined with zero-effort and spoofed
impostor trials, and the average.
LFCC, ICMC and CQCC features perform marginally bet-
ter than MFCC features. LFCC features generalise better across
development and evaluation subsets, giving the best average
(zero-effort and spoofing impostor) results of 13% and 10%
EER for each approach to combination. This observation shows
that other features that give better performance in terms of
spoofing detection do not necessarily give the best performance
when ASV and PAD are combined. This is probably due to use
of single features which avoids redundant processing and sim-
plifies the combination of ASV-PAD decisions.
These same results also show that the Gaussian back-end
fusion approach proposed in this paper outperforms the cas-
cade/tandem combination and the LR and PLR approaches. The
improvement in performance is attributed to use of a single,
flexible and jointly-optimised, instead of independently opti-
mised, rigid thresholds. The former gives better capacity to
reject spoofed trials with less impact on the rejection of target
trials. The Gaussian back-end fusion approach reported in this
paper therefore offers better robustness to spoofing and better
usability. Results for LR and PLR fusion approaches are glob-
ally worse with respect to the other two approaches. Moreover,
they exhibit similar performance for development and evalua-
tion sets, but with a lack of generalisation.
Finally, Fig. 2 shows the 2D score space representation for
the LFCC features for development and evaluation set. By
analysing the data distribution, it is clear that a decision can
not be taken using approaches with rigid thresholds optimised
on development set.
target spoof zero-effort
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Figure 2: Two-dimensional PAD-ASV score representation cor-
responding to LFCC features for development (left) and evalu-
ation (right) set. Green dots represent target trials, while blue
stars represent zero-effort trials and red crosses are spoof trials.
6. Conclusions
This paper presents a comparative study of the performance of
different front-ends when used for both automatic speaker ver-
ification (ASV) and presentation attack detection (PAD). Per-
formance is assessed with difference approaches to system inte-
gration including cascaded combination, linear and polynomial
logistic regression and a Gaussian back-end fusion approach.
The use of a single front-end for both ASV and PAD systems
simplifies integration in terms of convenience and efficiency;
computational effort is reduced by avoiding redundant process-
ing.
Performance is assessed using the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0
database. Results show that feature that achieve the best results
for independent ASV or PAD tasks do not give the best perfor-
mance when systems are combined. The cascaded approach to
ASV and PAD combination, as well as the logistic and poly-
nomial logistic regression approach, improve reliability in the
case where the nature of non-target trials is known. When faced
with unknown, or previously unseen forms of non-target trials
and spoofing attacks, then performance degrades significantly;
these approaches to ASV and PAD combination fail to gener-
alise. In contrast, the Gaussian back-end approach to integra-
tion is shown to generalise well and gives the lowest equal error
rate for the independent evaluation set.
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